G. Summary 48. To date, Iran has not provided to the Agency any report on the status for safeguards purposes of the nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks of June 2025 and associated nuclear material, or provided access to these facilities as required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Therefore, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities at these facilities in Iran. Consequently, the Agency cannot verify the status, for safeguards purposes, of these affected nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material.
49. Overall, the Agency cannot verify:
• whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development;
• whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities;
• the size of Iran’s uranium stockpile at the affected facilities;
• whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects;
• Iran’s inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.
In addition, Iran is not implementing the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, nor is it implementing the Additional Protocol. Moreover, in light of Iran’s continued unwillingness to address the unresolved safeguards issues, the Agency has outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
50. The Director General has emphasized to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement effectively the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended by Iran under any circumstances.
51. While the Agency acknowledged that the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities had created an unprecedented situation, it is critical for it to conduct verification activities in Iran without any further delay in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and, as required, under the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.
52. Within the group of affected facilities, it is a matter of increasing concern that Iran has never provided the Agency with access to its fourth declared enrichment facility since it was first declared by Iran in June last year.
53. Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, of which it had accumulated 440.9 kg by the time of the military attacks in mid-June 2025. The Agency’s lack of access to verify the previously declared HEU and LEU, for over eight months – which is long overdue according to standard safeguards practice – is a matter of proliferation concern GOV/2026/8 Page 11 and of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Agency’s loss of continuity of knowledge over all previously declared nuclear material at affected facilities in Iran needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency.
54. The Director General notes that once again Iran has not engaged the Agency during this reporting period on the unresolved safeguards issues.
55. The Director General calls on Iran to engage the Agency constructively in order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.
56. On 17 and 26 February 2026, the Director General was in attendance at the negotiations between the United States of America and Iran, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. The bilateral negotiations are ongoing and are without prejudice to Iran’s obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. A successful outcome of these negotiations would have a positive impact on the effective implementation of safeguards in Iran and the resolution of issues described in this report. Technical discussions will take place in Vienna in the week beginning 2 March 2026.
57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.